The Campaign of 1863

The Campaign of 1863 (
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EVERS 11-02-2020 06:56 PM

that was pretty cool huh, how he escaped his death by scalping, by dawning the ice scates and getting away fast down the lake

EVERS 11-02-2020 07:02 PM





Cincinnati Commercial Gazette,
AUGUST, 1888.

Second Edition, with Corrections.


Comrades of the Society of the Army of the Cumberland:

When General H. V. Boynton's letters recently appeared in the Cincinnati Commercial Gazette, so vividly portraying the achievements and heroism of the Army of the Cumberland in its campaign for the possession of Chattanooga, including the inevitable incident thereto, the battle of Chickamauga, I thought how agreeable it would be for each member of the society to have a copy for perusal at our approaching reunion on the twenty-fifth anniversary of Chickamauga.

Accordingly I asked General Boynton's permission to print these letters in pamphlet form, as advance sheets of any volume in which he may determine to put them with other matter. To this he most cheerfully assented in the following letter:

Washington, Sept. 1, 1888.

My Dear General: You are welcome to the Chickamauga letters for any use you choose to make of them. While the salient features of both days' battle are easily understood, the details of movements by brigades are in many cases intricate. For this reason various errors may have been made in the text. If those who observe them will take the trouble to correct them before the public, they would thus assist in establishing the correct history of a battle in which the Army of the Cumberland should take great pride.

Very truly yours,

General W. S. Rosecrans.

With this explanation, the letters are given in the order of their respective dates.


EVERS 11-02-2020 07:05 PM

Washington, August 3. [Special.]—In two preliminary letters about Chickamauga the attempt was made to describe the field as it appears to-day, and to present some of the scenes of the battle which came rushing back over the plains of memory with a power suggestive of the departed legions that once clothed these farms, forests, and ridges with the terrible magnificence of battle.

In a sense, to write of Chickamauga is to try to excite interest in a subject which far too many regard as worn; but to the veterans who fought there it will never be a threadbare story. For that generation which has been born and has come to manhood since Chattanooga was won by the Union arms, there is no campaign which can be studied with greater profit, or which will more richly repay the reader. History has not yet done justice to Chickamauga, but its verdict is sure. Many of the misconceptions of the days following the battle still exist in the popular mind. It may be years before they are cleared away; but eventually the Chickamauga campaign will stand in the history of our war as unequaled in its strategy by any other movement of the contest, and as unsurpassed, and probably not equaled, for the stubbornness and deadliness which marked the splendid fighting of Unionist and rebel alike; and, furthermore, it will stand as a substantial Union victory.

Just in proportion as the credit due is awarded to those who planned and executed the campaign will well-merited condemnation be meted out to those at Washington who insisted upon forcing the movement without regard to proper and vital preparation, who withheld re-enforcements, and who, in spite of public and private warnings which it was criminal not to heed, made rebel concentrations against Rosecrans possible from in front of Washington itself, and from Charleston, Mobile, and Mississippi.

It will be the purpose of a few letters to go over some of the well-known ground of this campaign with a view of enforcing the ideas expressed in general terms above, and attempting to present a clear account of this most involved, and still seriously misunderstood battle. The strategy—matchless in our war—which compelled Bragg to abandon Chattanooga; the life and death struggle for concentrating the Union army when Rosecrans, against the protests of Washington authorities that it could not be true, found his widely separated corps confronted with re-enforcements from every part of the Confederacy; and, lastly, the great battle in the Chickamauga forests for the possession of Chattanooga,[6] are each most fruitful and interesting themes. The present letter will relate to the first-named subject, the strategy of the Chickamauga campaign.

Marching from Murfreesboro on the 23d of June, 1863, General Rosecrans had advanced against Bragg, who was strongly fortified, and whose lines, besides, occupied gaps and ranges of great natural strength. By brilliant strategy, with the loss of only 586 killed and wounded, and thirteen captured or missing, the Army of the Cumberland, with its nine divisions and twenty brigades, operating through sixteen days of continuous rain, maneuvered Bragg, with his seven divisions and twenty-three brigades, out of his natural and artificial strongholds, and forced him across the Tennessee. Up to that time there had been no strategic campaign to equal this, and it was soon to be far surpassed, except in the one element of loss, by the campaign to follow it. So brilliant had been the conception and the execution that all the corps commanders, headed by General Thomas, hastened to call on General Rosecrans and offer the warmest congratulations.

At the close of the Tullahoma campaign Bragg occupied Chattanooga and the mountain passes above and below it. Rosecrans's army lay along the western base of the Cumberland Mountains, its right above Winchester and its left at McMinnville. Here General Rosecrans at once began the most vigorous preparations for another campaign for the occupation of Chattanooga. Because the necessities of the case compelled secrecy as one of the main elements of success, there was soon at Washington a manifestation of unreasoning impatience over what was criticized as the inaction of the Union commander; but those who were on the ground know well the unceasing activity and energy with which the work progressed of accumulating sufficient supplies of food, material, and ammunition, preparing the means for crossing the Tennessee and obtaining the necessary knowledge of the mountain passes, roads, and trails by which the army must move. Rosecrans's supplies reached him over a badly equipped line of worn railroad, a hundred and thirteen miles in length, and, as can be readily understood, when the daily wants of a great army preparing for extended movement and battle are considered, the matter of accumulating a surplus of supplies was not the task of a day or a week. With every effort the railroad was not repaired until July 25, and the forward movement began on the 14th of August.

A glance at the map will disclose the great natural obstacles which lay between General Rosecrans and Chattanooga. As his army faced toward the latter point, the Cumberland[7] Mountains, with a general elevation of 2,200 feet, rose before it. The escarpment was everywhere precipitous, and destitute of every means of approach except narrow mountain roads and trails, with the one exception that a short railroad ran from Cowan to Tracy City, on the summit of the range. To the eastward this range dropped by like precipitous and difficult slopes into the valley of the Sequatchee River. Beyond that stream rose the equally sharp cliffs of Walden's Ridge, with a general elevation of 1,300 feet. This fell off along the eastern and southern edge of the plateau into the valley of the Tennessee, and overlooked it from the mouth of the Sequatchee River to a point far above Chattanooga. It was fifty miles as the crow flies from the lines of Rosecrans's army across this continuous mountain region to the valley of the Tennessee. This river was broad and deep, and presented in itself the most serious natural obstacle which the Union army had encountered since it left the Ohio River. It was 2,700 feet wide at Bridgeport, and 1,254 feet at Caperton, the points where the bridges were subsequently thrown.

EVERS 11-02-2020 07:15 PM

On the left bank of the river, the stronghold of Chattanooga lying behind the river, and the great ranges to the westward between Rosecrans's position and his own, might well seem to Bragg impregnable, in fact almost unassailable. First, toward the west, came the Lookout range, rising abruptly from the river to the height of 2,200 feet, and stretching southwestwardly far into Georgia and Alabama. Its western precipices looked down into the narrow valley of Lookout Creek. Beyond the latter rose the equally precipitous cliffs of the Raccoon Mountains, the latter having the same general elevation as the Lookout range.

The gorge of the Tennessee where it breaks through these mountain ranges is so narrow and so thoroughly commanded from the heights on both sides as to render it impracticable to so move an army as to attack it from the front or river side.

With these giant obstacles to the progress of his columns, most serious even if they had been within the Union lines, but almost insuperable when found in an enemy's territory, and while he was bending every energy to complete preparations for carrying out a brilliant plan of his own for overcoming them, General Rosecrans was astonished at receiving on August 4, only ten days after his railroad had been repaired to the Tennessee River, a dispatch from Halleck saying: "Your forces must move forward without delay. You will daily report the movement of each corps till you cross the Tennessee River."[8]

To a commander who was building boats, opening mountain roads, rushing the accumulation of stores, getting out material for four thousand feet of bridges, preparing to leave his base carrying provisions for twenty-five days, and ammunition for two battles, and crossing three mountain ranges and a deep and broad river, in an enemy's country, and in the face of an army, this dispatch was not only astounding, but discouraging and exasperating to the last degree.

It had become a habit at Washington to sneer at the slowness of General Rosecrans, as it was later to denounce General Thomas in similar terms at Nashville. There was no more reason or justice in the one case than in the other. The verdict of history has been reached in the case of General Thomas. It is sure to come, and to be the same in this matter, for Rosecrans.

To this dispatch, which can only be excused on the ground of wholly inexcusable ignorance of the active preparations in progress and the natural difficulties of an advance, General Rosecrans replied with his accustomed clearness and spirit: "Your dispatch ordering me to move forward without delay, reporting the movements of each corps till I cross the Tennessee, is received. As I have determined to cross the river as soon as practicable, and have been making all preparations and getting such information as may enable me to do so without being driven back, like Hooker, I wish to know if your order is intended to take away my discretion as to the time and manner of moving my troops." To this Halleck responded: "The orders for the advance of your army, and that it be reported daily, are peremptory." General Rosecrans immediately wrote the following reply, and, calling his corps commanders together, read the dispatches given above. There was no dissent from the proposition that at that stage of their preparations it was impossible to move. He then read his reply as follows, and all approved and agreed that they should support him:

"General Halleck: My arrangements for beginning a continuous movement will be completed and the execution begun Monday next. We have information to show that crossing the Tennessee between Bridgeport and Chattanooga is impracticable, but not enough to show whether we had better cross above Chattanooga and strike Cleveland, or below Bridgeport and strike in their rear. The preliminary movement of troops for the two cases are very different. It is necessary to have our means of crossing the river completed, and our supplies provided to cross sixty miles of mountains and sustain ourselves during the operations of crossing and fighting, before we move. To obey your order literally would[9] be to push our troops into the mountains on narrow and difficult roads, destitute of pasture and forage, and short of water, where they would not be able to maneuver as exigencies may demand, and would certainly cause ultimate delay and probable disaster. If, therefore, the movement which I propose cannot be regarded as obedience to your order, I respectfully request a modification of it or to be relieved from the command."

On the following day Halleck replied as follows:

"I have communicated to you the wishes of the Government in plain and unequivocal terms. The objective has been stated, and you have been directed to lose no time in reaching it. The means you are to employ and the roads you are to follow are left to your own discretion. If you wish to promptly carry out the wishes of the Government you will not stop to discuss mere details. In such matters I do not interfere."

EVERS 11-02-2020 07:24 PM

This was answered the same day by General Rosecrans as follows:

"Your dispatch received. I can only repeat the assurance given before the issuance of the order. This army shall move with all dispatch compatible with the successful execution of our work. We are pressing everything to bring up forage for our animals. The present rolling-stock of the road will barely suffice to keep us day by day here, but I have bought fifty more freight cars, which are arriving. Will advise you daily."

This was the last of interference from Washington, but, accustomed as all there were to interfering at will, and directing affairs according to the situation as they saw it, they could not brook such manifestly proper independence as was shown by Rosecrans, and from that time forward there was needed only an excuse to insure his removal.

Had there been a tithe of the attention given to preventing the rebels from concentrating on his front from every part of the Confederacy—in fact, bringing Longstreet's veterans from the lines under Halleck's own eyes—that there was to the kind of interference which has been noticed, Bragg would have been destroyed in front of Chattanooga. But this subject properly belongs in a succeeding letter. The dispatches given above are well known, but their reproduction will prove a convenience to readers who may not carry their exact terms in mind.

Ten days later, namely, on August 14, the movement to secure Chattanooga began. A glance at the map will reveal its strategy.[10]

Rosecrans had decided to cross the Tennessee in the vicinity of Bridgeport, and subsequently the Raccoon and Lookout Mountain ranges at points south of Chattanooga, and thus compel Bragg to evacuate the place or to come out of it and fight for his line of communications. It is easily seen that if after crossing the river the enemy, warned in time, should be found in force on the western slopes of these ranges further progress in that direction would have been impossible, and a return to the north bank of the river obligatory. It was, therefore, necessary to wholly deceive Bragg as to the points of crossing.

Burnside was marching from Kentucky into East Tennessee. Any apparent movement of the Army of the Cumberland in force in that direction would naturally lead Bragg to believe that a junction of the Union forces was contemplated on his right.

Everything being ready, Crittenden opened the campaign with the Twenty-first Corps. Leaving his camps at Hillsboro, Manchester, and McMinnville on the 16th of August, he crossed the Cumberland Mountains and occupied the Sequachee Valley from a point between Jasper and Dunlap to Pikeville. Van Cleve held the latter place, Palmer was established at Dunlap, and Wood at Anderson, between Dunlap and Jasper. All built extensive camp fires and moved about in such ways as to convey to observers from the heights the impression that the whole army was moving. Meantime Minty's active cavalry had moved through Sparta and driven Dibrell's cavalry eastward through Crossville, on to the Tennessee, and over it, and Dibrell, having come to reconnoiter and see what was going on, naturally got the idea that Rosecrans's army was coming. The crossing of the Cumberland was but the first step of the imposing diversion. Though the mountain roads were few and very difficult, Crittenden's movements over them had been completed exactly on time. The advance over Walden's Ridge, equally difficult, though it was not quite as high as the main range, was immediately undertaken. Minty, on the extreme left, appeared on the Tennessee more than thirty miles above Blythe's Ferry, where he made most energetic commotion. Hazen reached the river in the vicinity of Dallas. Two brigades were strung out along the edge of the cliffs on the top of Walden's Ridge, where they overlooked Blythe's Ferry, and could be seen from the other side of the river. Minty, with his troopers, swept down the valley of the Tennessee to near Chattanooga. Wilder and Wagner also appeared in the valley. While a show of building boats was made in the small streams about Blythe's Ferry, Wilder from the heights[11] of Walden's Ridge, opposite Chattanooga, opened fire on the town with artillery. Bragg was thoroughly deceived. Forrest was ordered far up the Tennessee to Kingston to watch for the expected crossing. Buckner was ordered from East Tennessee toward Blythe's Ferry.

As may be supposed, Wilder's cannonading produced the wildest excitement in Chattanooga. The rolling-stock of the railroads was hastened out of reach. The depots of supplies were moved out of the range of the unexpected bombardment. D. H. Hill's corps was hurried off to guard the river above, and other heavy forces were moved in the same direction. Everything done by Bragg was based upon the idea that Rosecrans was moving in force to points on the river above the city.

Meantime the real movement was going on quietly sixty to eighty miles in the opposite direction, in the vicinity of Bridgeport and Stevenson. A force of cavalry for the purposes of observation, and to convey the idea by quick movements that Rosecrans was feigning below, while really expecting to cross above the city, was sent as far westward as Decatur. Thus Rosecrans was operating along the river through a hundred miles of mountain region and fifty miles of low country beyond, and in spite of the natural difficulties every part of the plan was working with precision.

Thomas and McCook on the right moved at the same time with Crittenden. Reynolds, of Thomas's corps, had marched in advance and repaired the roads by way of University, and down the eastern slope of the mountain to Jasper. Brannan followed him, and both were at first kept well out of sight of the river. Baird and Negley came down nearer to Bridgeport, and McCook descended back of Stevenson. With the exception of Sheridan, at Bridgeport, all were kept well out of sight from the enemy's cavalry on the left bank.

Sheridan alone made a show of his presence and openly began the construction of a trestle through the shoal water, in order to lessen the length of the floating bridge. As this was without a decided show of strength it deepened the impression that the movements on this wing were the feint and those toward the upper river the real move. In fact, after watching Sheridan's trestle building for a while from the other side of the river, Anderson's brigade of infantry, the only infantry force available to oppose a passage of the river, was withdrawn and sent to Chattanooga.

The bridge for Caperton's Ferry was brought down on a train, which was halted out of sight, and a road cut for its transportation through the woods to a point near its desti[12]nation, where the troops which were to lay it were drilled in their work.

Early on the 29th fifty boats, each carrying fifty men, were brought out of the woods near Caperton's, rushed across an open field, launched, and quickly rowed to the opposite shore. The Confederate cavalry pickets were driven off and twenty-five hundred men held the south bank. The bridge was promptly laid. Davis was soon over, and then McCook's entire corps, with cavalry, started promptly for Valley Head, forty miles down the Lookout range. Reynolds collected boats at Shellmound, Brannan had built rafts and cut out canoes at the mouth of Battle Creek. The long bridge was successfully laid at Bridgeport, and before Bragg had recovered from his surprise, in fact before he had comprehended the extent of the movement, Rosecrans, with two corps, was over the river and moving on his communications.

As soon as the crossing was assured, Crittenden marched with celerity by way of the Sequatchee Valley towards the bridges and was soon across with the main body and advancing on the left of it directly towards Chattanooga.

EVERS 11-02-2020 07:35 PM

what a boring book, I like the book where they tell about Rosecrans Adjutant getting his head blown off by a solid cannon shot, and then, his body held the reigns for a few paces, then fell slowly off. Gerrish, was his name.

EVERS 11-02-2020 07:41 PM

This Eccentric Officer 'Knew' He Would Die in His First Battle

By Dr. Homer Pittard

OF THE 1,717 battlefield deaths among the 13,176 Union casualties at bloody Stones River, the most dramatic was that of Lt. Col. Julius Peter Garesche, Chief-of-Staff, Army of the Cumberland. Garesche met violent death on the morning of Dec. 31, 1862, at a time when the Union right had crumbled and was being driven back in disorder against the Nashville Pike.

The general commanding, impulsive Maj. Gen. William Rosecrans, had taken the personal responsibility of forming a new line. Detached companies, regiments, and pieces of artillery, streaming through the cedars to the south of the pike, were halted and placed in patchwork alignment facing the enemy. Shouting encouragement to spur the flagging spirits of his men, Rosecrans rode along the lines and across the open fields. In full view of the Confederates, who had by then moved into position, he became a prime target. Following close at his heels were his chief-of-staff and two orderlies.

Near the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad, which bisects the field, a shell tore through a tall cedar. Rosecrans and his tiny entourage galloped into its path. There was a slight puff and 100 yards beyond them the projectile bounced along the ground and then exploded. Garesche's head was squashed like a pumpkin and carried away. Only a fragment of the jaw carrying a patch from his full beard remained. As his horse jogged along, the headless trunk sat erect for some 20 paces and then slid to the ground.

Decapitations were almost routine in cavalry and closeup artillery combat. On the afternoon of the previous day, a corporal, standing in front of the general's marquee, had been beheaded by a stray solid shot. Of course Garesche's demise was significant because of his prominence among the members of the general staff. He was Rosecrans' pen and voice. His proxy dispatches to be found in the Official Records are classics of conciseness and precision. But the most impelling and macabre circumstance surrounding his violent end was that Garesche was possessed by an absorbing presentiment that he would die in his first battle. The men around him were aware of this and his actions were closely observed as the Battle of Stones River approached.

At West Point, despite his facility for collecting demerits and a debilitating encounter with goitre, Garesehe had graduated in 1841, standing 30th in a class of 52. An aloofness accentuated by extreme nearsightedness had restricted his circle of friends while at the Academy. However, he had formed a fast friendship with William Roseerans, who was his academic junior by one year. Later Garesche was instrumental in leading his future commander into Catholicism and, as assistant adjutant general in Washington, slashed red tape to procure Roseerans his commission as brigadier general in the Regular Army.

Garesche's post-Academy assignment was a second lieutenancy with the 4th Artillery stationed at Fort Brown, Tex. It was at this point that he became absorbed with his first great presentiment that he was destined to suffer a violent death. This was some 21 years before Stones River.

During the interval between graduation and his first assignment he had visited his father in St. Louis. His family, having come into possession of 2,000 acres of land lying at the junction of the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers, was experiencing difficulty with woodcutters and squatters. In order to secure rights until the courts could decide the issue, an armed guard had been employed to patrol the area. Julius volunteered his services and spent several days with two other men tramping through the underbrush and swamp-infested lowlands. One afternoon after a long search for a camping ground the three men found an abandoned cabin. Although it perched precariously on the banks of the Missouri it was satisfactory for the late hour, and blankets were spread on the floor. During the night the water rose and the earth supporting the cabin crumbled away. Julius and his companions were awakened by the creaking timbers and catapulted through the doorway to safety just as the cabin settled and slowly disappeared in the waters below.

Appraising the incident later, brother Frederick, who was training for the priesthood, interpreted it as an omen of disaster. This pronouncement made an indelible impression on Julius and thereafter every act involving physical danger and personal reverses became a piece of the mosaic fulfilling his destined violent end. Years later, in Louisville, his nearsightedness carried him one night from the street onto a railroad track. Again he escaped death by stumbling aside as a train rushed by. There was no doubt now; his brother's words assumed oracular proportions.

EVERS 11-02-2020 07:47 PM

Garesche's last morning on earth began in a small tent near headquarters. High mass, with Rev. Father Cooney of the 55th Indiana Regiment officiating, was celebrated. One hundred yards away to the north a thin mist hung close to the river, and Van Cleve's division could be seen moving up closer to the ford. The Battle of Stones River was less than a half hour away. During the early hours of the morning, battle sounds to the south and the retrograde movement of McCook's right wing revealed that Rosecrans' strategy had gone awry. In the bedlam behind the pike, one observer saw Garesche dismount and enter a small grove of trees. It was also observed that after opening his prayer book and reading for a few moments, he remounted and joined Rosecrans. Five minutes later he was dead. It had been 15 months and 17 days since his brother's prophecy.

Brig. Gen. William Hazen, who directed the shallow, temporary interment of Garesche on a tiny knoll nearby, describes the scene in a letter found in the Annals of the Army of the Cumberland:

I saw but a headless trunk: an eddy of crimson foam had issued where the head should be. I at once recognized his figure, it lay so naturally, his right hand across his breast. As I approached, dismounted, and bent over him, the contraction of a muscle extended his hand slowly and slightly towards me. Taking hold of it, I found it warm and lifelike. Upon one of the fingers was the class ring, that (to me) beautiful talisman of our common school.

The following day the body was removed and carried to Nashville for embalming. The Surgeon General's reports carried this grisly note: "On discovering a protuberance extending some five inches from the spine I thought it well to remove it for the sake of conformity." Interment was later made in Mt. Olivet Cemetery, Washington, D.C.

EVERS 11-04-2020 02:45 AM

well, we have a late consession tomorrow, and I know who concedes, you can't fool me.

EVERS 11-05-2020 12:43 PM


From the Earliest Date to the Present Time






High Street, Bloomsbury, W.C.



The sad death of Mr. Harbottle, just as this work was going to press, has thrown upon me the onus of correcting the proofs and preparing the Index. The necessity for hurrying the work through the press has precluded comparison of the references in every instance with the original sources from which the Author had taken them; if therefore some few printer's errors or varieties of spelling may still remain, they may, I hope, be attributed to the imperfections of one, who had to step suddenly into the breach caused by the loss of a valued friend and collaborator, whose patience in research, depth of knowledge and accuracy in compilation, he could never hope to equal.

October, 1904. P. H. Dalbiac.



Abensberg (Campaign of Wagram.)

Fought April 20, 1809, between the French and Bavarians under Napoleon, about 90,000 strong, and the Austrians, 80,000 in number, under the Archduke Charles. On the French left, Lanne's corps drove back the Austrians, after a feeble resistance. In the centre the Bavarians were hard pressed, but eventually Napoleon succeeded in turning the Austrian flank, left exposed by the defeat of their right, and Charles was forced to retreat. The Austrians lost 7,000, the French and Bavarians about 3,000 killed and wounded.

Aberdeen (Civil War).

Fought September 13, 1644, between the Covenanters, 3,000 strong, under Lord Burleigh, and the Royalists, about 1,500 strong, under Montrose. The Covenanters were put to flight, and no quarter being given, they lost heavily before reaching Aberdeen. The Royalist losses were insignificant.

Aboukir (French Invasion of Egypt).

Fought July 5, 1799, Napoleon attacking the position held by Mustapha Pasha, who had recently landed in Egypt at the head of 18,000 Turks. The French were completely successful, two-thirds of the Turkish troops being killed or driven into the sea, while 6,000, with the Pasha, surrendered.

Aboukir (British Invasion of Egypt).

Fought March 8, 1801, when 5,000 British under Sir Ralph Abercromby disembarked on the beach at Aboukir, in the face of a force of 2,000 French under General Friant. The landing was effected under a heavy musketry and artillery fire, which cost the assailants 1,100 killed and wounded, and the French were driven from their positions with a loss of 500 men.


See Nile.

Abu Hamed (Soudan Campaigns).

Fought August 7, 1897, when the Dervish entrenchments outside Abu Hamed were stormed by a Soudanese Brigade, with 2 guns Royal Artillery, under Major-General Hunter. The Mahdist garrison was driven through the town, losing heavily, and their commander, Mohammed Zain, captured. The Egyptian loss was 80 killed and wounded, including 4 British officers.

Abu Klea (Soudan Campaigns).

Fought January 17, 1885, 2between a British force, 1,500 strong, under Sir Herbert Stewart, and 12,000 Mahdists, of whom about 5,000 actually attacked. The British square was broken at one corner, owing to the jamming of a Gardner gun, and the Mahdists forcing their way inside, a desperate hand-to-hand conflict followed. Eventually the assailants were driven off, and the square reformed. The British loss was 18 officers, among them Colonel Fred. Burnaby, and 150 men. In the immediate vicinity of the square, 1,100 Arab dead were counted.

Abu Kru (Soudan Campaigns).

Fought January 19, 1885, between 1,200 British troops under Sir Herbert Stewart, and a large force of Mahdists. The Mahdists attacked a short distance from the Nile, and the British square moved towards the river, repelling all assaults successfully till they reached the Nile. The British losses were 121, including Sir Herbert Stewart, mortally wounded. This action is also known as the battle of Gubat.

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